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Consider a situation where a number of individuals or players are connected in some
network relationship. The applications are quite wide and varied, ranging from friend-
ships and social relationships, to communicating information about job openings, to
business partnerships, to international trade agreements, and political alliances. What
is in common to these situations is that the way in which players are connected to each
other (for instance who talks to whom, or which countries have free-trade agreements)
is important in determining the total productivity or value generated by the group.1
This paper examines the allocation of value among players connected by a network.
How the fruits of the total productive value are allocated or transferred among players
turns out to be important, not only in terms of fairness considerations, but also because
it determines players’ incentives to form various networks.
The allocation of value among a set of players has a rich axiomatic history in the co-
operative game theory literature. There, the primitive information is what productive
value is generated by each possible group of agents or coalition. Well-known rules such
as the Shapley Value and Nucleolus provide natural ways of allocating the value among
players. However, as mentioned above, in many applications the value generated by
some group of players depends not only on their identities but also on how they are
connected to each other. That is, alternative network structures (e.g., communication
lines, alliances, friendships, etc.) connecting the same set of players might lead to very
diﬀerent costs and beneﬁts. Thus, in many situations it will be important to account
for network structure and not just coalition structure.
Myerson (1977) made a seminal contribution in adapting the cooperative game
theory structure to accommodate information about the network connecting players.
The way in which he did this was by augmenting a cooperative game by a network
structure which might be viewed as the lines of communication open to players. Once
the network is ﬁxed, such a communication game may be viewed as a cooperative game
where the role of the network is to deﬁne which coalitions can function. The feasible
coalitions are the ones whose members can freely communicate via the given network
(so that any two players in the coalition are path connected in the network via players in
the coalition). In a sense, each network structure and characteristic function (indicating
how much value a given coalition can generate) induces a particular cooperative game.
1See Jackson (2003) for a recent survey of some of the literature on network games.
2I will refer to this class as the class of communication games.2 Myerson (1977) showed
that there exists a nice extension of the Shapley Value to communication games, and
that it has a simple and intuitive characterization. This allocation rule has come to be
called the Myerson Value in the subsequent literature.3
While such communication games are a useful augmentation of cooperative games,
they fail to be rich enough to capture most applications where network structures
are important. The shortcoming is easily seen. Consider a group of players {1,2,3}.
Under this sort of communication game, this group generates the same productive
value whether (i) they are each connected to each other via a complete network (a link
between 1 and 2, a link between 2 and 3, and a link between 1 and 3); or (ii) they are
connected via a less complete network such as one with a link between 1 and 2 and a
link between 2 and 3, but no link between 1 and 3. To the extent that there are any
costs to links, or beneﬁts from shortened paths, etc., it will generally be the case that
the value generated in these two scenarios diﬀers.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced a class of games where the value generated
depends directly on the network structure. This allows the value generated by the three
players {1,2,3} to depend on the network structure so it can diﬀer between cases (i)
and (ii) above. I will refer to this class as the class of network games. Network games
include cooperative games and communication games as special cases, but generally
allow for costs and beneﬁts to accrue diﬀerently to diﬀerent sets of links, and allow
for externalities and such across players and networks. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
showed that the Myerson Value has a direct extension from communication games to
network games.
While network games are richer than communication games and readily apply to
a wide class of situations, the extension of the Myerson value to network games still
inherits much of its perspective from communication games. Most importantly, under
the Myerson value the network is implicitly viewed as ﬁxed when value is being allo-
cated. In particular, while the Myerson Value involves Shapley Value style calculations
that account for how the network is built up, it does not account for the value of al-
ternative network structures that might have formed. I shall return to illustrate and
discuss this in more detail below.
2Myerson (1977) referred to the networks as cooperation structures. Much of the literature that
followed Myerson has used the term communication structures (see the survey by van den Nouweland
(2003), and so I will call those communication games.
3See Aumann and Myerson (1988).
3Here, I take the view that the network is not a permanent ﬁxture, but is something
that is either being formed or might change in the future. ¿From this point of view the
allocation of value at a given network can and should depend on the value that might
accrue to alternative potential networks. In particular, evaluating the contribution to
value of a given link or player depends on the contribution of that link or player to
various networks, and perhaps more importantly, which to what extent other links or
p l a y e r sm i g h ts e r v ea sas u bs t i t u t e .
To understand why this issue arises in network games, but not in either coopera-
tive games or communication games, it is important to recognize that in a cooperative
game or communication game it is generally assumed that it is eﬃcient for the grand
coalition to form.4 The idea is that the grand coalition can always do whatever smaller
coalitions can do, and possibly more. Once one moves to network games, however,
larger networks might have higher costs associated with them than some smaller net-
works. For instance, the value generated by the complete network might be much less
than the value generated by some sub-network network. This means that generally,
the most eﬃcient network (in a value maximizing sense) might not be the complete
network. This introduces some important new considerations in the allocation of value
that did not arise in the context of cooperative or communication games.
The considerations that are important in network games but did not arise in co-
operative and communication games are most easily seen through some examples that
I will present shortly. But to get some preview of what is going on, let me discuss it
brieﬂy now. In order to ﬁgure out how to allocate value across players, a rule such
as the Shapley Value decomposes the grand coalition in various ways in evaluating
players’ contributions. However, given that the grand coalition is the ultimate one
that forms, the issue of what other coalitions might have formed, or what other players
might have played the role of a given player never really arise. In contrast, in the con-
text of a network game, it is often (perhaps even generally) the case given any implicit
or explicit costs to links that the set of eﬃcient networks will not include the complete
network. This means that we must care about how to allocate value to some networks
that are not complete networks. In such cases, the allocation of value may depend on
information about the roles of given players that involve calculations based on networks
that are not subnetworks of a given network. For instance, if we consider a player at
the center of a star network (where all players are connected to this center player but
4An exception are cooperative games in partition function form, as introduced by Lucas and Thrall
(195?). However, that literature has not developed methods of allocating value that would help here.
4not directly to each other), how much value accrues to this player might depend on
whether this player is the only one who can serve this function, or whether it is the
case than any player could equally well have served as the center in a productive way.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides deﬁnitions for network games.
Section 3 provides an example illustrating some of the issues. Section 4 introduces
two new allocation rules and characterizes them. Section 5 provides a deﬁnition of
the core for network games and two other new allocation rules. Section 6 provides a
general method of deﬁning allocation rules. Section 7 concludes with a comparison of
the properties satisﬁed by various allocation rules.
2 Network Games and Allocation Functions
Players
N = {1,...,n} is a set of players who are connected in some network relationship.
The set N will generally be ﬁxed in what follows.
Networks
A network is a list of which pairs of players are linked to each other and is modeled
as a non-directed graph. A network is thus a list of unordered pairs of players {i,j},
where {i,j}∈g indicates that i and j are linked under the network g.
For simplicity, write ij to represent the link {i,j},a n ds oij ∈ g indicates that i
and j are linked under the network g.
More formally, let gN be the set of all subsets of N of size 2. G = {g ⊂ gN} denotes
the set of all possible networks or graphs on N.
For instance, if N = {1,2,3} then g = {12,23} is the network where there is a link
between players 1 and 2, a link between players 2 and 3, but no link between players
1a n d3 .
The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g is denoted g + ij
and the network obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network g is denoted
g − ij.
Let N(g) be the set of players who have at least one link in g.T h a ti s ,
N(g)={i|∃j s.t.i j∈ g}.
Let n(g)=# N(g) be the number of players involved in g.
5Let Li(g) be the set of links that player i is involved in, so that
Li(g)={ij|∃j s.t.i j∈ g},




i  i(g) denote the number of links in g.
Networks on Subsets of Players
Given any S ⊂ N,l e tgS be the set of all subsets of S of size 2, so that gS is the
complete network among the players in S.
Let
g|S = {ij : ij ∈ g and i ∈ S,j ∈ S}.
Thus g|S is the network found deleting all links except those that are between players
in S.
Note the important distinction between the notation gS which is the complete
network among players in S,a n dg|S which is the network found by starting with some
g and then eliminating links involving players outside of S.
Paths
A path in a network g ∈ G between players i and j is a sequence of players i1,...,i K
such that ikik+1 ∈ g for each k ∈{ 1,...,K− 1},w i t hi1 = i and iK = j.
Components
Looking at the path relationships in a network naturally partitions a network into
diﬀerent connected subgraphs that are commonly referred to as components.
A component of a network g, is a nonempty subnetwork g  ⊂ g, such that
• if i ∈ N(g )a n dj ∈ N(g )w h e r ej  = i, then there exists a path in g  between i
and j,a n d
• if i ∈ N(g )a n dj/ ∈ N(g ) then there does not exist a path in g between i and j.
Thus, the components of a network are the distinct connected subgraphs of a net-
work.
The set of components of g is denoted C(g). Note that g = ∪g ∈C(g) g .
Under this deﬁnition of component, a completely isolated player who has no links
is not considered a component.
Value Functions
6A value function is a function v : G → I R.
The set of all possible value functions is denoted V .
A value function speciﬁes the total value that is generated by a given network struc-
ture. The calculation of value may involve both costs and beneﬁts and is a richer object
than a characteristic function of a cooperative game, or that induced in a communica-
tion game, as it allows the value that accrues to depend on the network structure and
not only on the coalition of players involved (or who can communicate).
An interesting sub-class of value functions are those where the value to a given
component of a network does not depend on the structure of other components. This
precludes externalities across (but not within) components of a network. While the
characterizations below will apply more broadly, understanding behavior on component
additive value functions is useful in characterizing the Myerson Value.
A value function v is component additive if v(g)=
 
g ∈C(g) v(g ) for any g ∈ G and
g  ∈ C(g).
Eﬃcient Networks
An e t w o r kg ∈ G is eﬃcient relative to a value function v if v(g) ≥ v(g ) for all
g  ∈ G.
Thus, eﬃcient networks are value-maximizing networks.
Monotonic Covers
When we begin to think about the possibilities available to a set of links when
there is still some possibility of altering the network, it will useful to consider the value
generated by the maximum over possible networks that could be formed using the given
set of links links. This is captured by its monotonic cover.
Given a value function v,i t smonotonic cover   v is deﬁned by





A value function v is monotonic if v(g ) ≥ v(g) whenever g ⊂ g .
Note that a value function is monotonic if and only if v =   v.
In general the value functions that are natural in network games will not be mono-
tonic. Nevertheless, information about how allocation rules perform on monotonic
games will be useful.
A Basis for Value Functions
7It will be useful to deﬁne a basis for the set of value functions.




1i f g ⊂ g  and
0 otherwise.
Call such a vg a basic value function.
Note that any v can be written as a linear combination of basic value functions
vg’s. That is, for any v we can write v =
 
g cgvg for some collection of scalars cg.
This follows from viewing the v’s as vectors in I R2n(n−1)/2 and noting that the 2n(n−1)/2
diﬀerent vg’s are linearly independent and so form a basis for I R2n(n−1)/2 .
Network Games
A network game is a pair, (N,v), of a set of players and a value function.
Allocation Rules
How the value generated by a network is allocated among the players, either through
their decisions or perhaps even by some outside intervention, is described by an allo-
cation rule.




all v and g.
Note that balance (
 
i Yi(g,v)=v(g)) is built into the deﬁnition of an allocation
rule.
It is important to note that an allocation rule depends on both g and v. This allows
an allocation rule to take full account of an player i’s role in the network. This includes
not only what the network conﬁguration is, but also how the value generated depends
on the overall network structure. For instance, consider a network g = {12,23} in a
situation where v(g) = 1. Player 2’s allocation might be very diﬀerent depending on
what the values of other networks are. For instance, if v({12,23,13})=0=v({13}),
then in a sense 2 is essential to the network and may receive a large allocation. If on
the other hand v(g ) = 1 for all networks, then 2’s role is not particularly special. This
information might turn out to be relevant, which is why the allocation rule is allowed
(but not required) to depend on it.
3 The Myerson Value and some Examples
As mentioned in the introduction, Myerson (1977) developed a variation of the Shapley
value for communication games, which was subsequently referred to as the Myerson
8Value. The Myerson Value also has a corresponding allocation rule in the context of
network games which is a direct generalization of the version deﬁned by Myerson for
communication games, as shown by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). That allocation rule












The Myerson value is characterized by the following properties.
Component Balance
An allocation rule Y is component balanced if for any component additive v, g ∈ G,





Note that component balance only makes requirements on Y for v’s that are com-
ponent additive, and Y can be arbitrary otherwise. If v is not component additive,
then requiring component balance of an allocation rule Y (·,v) would necessarily violate
balance.
Component balance requires that if a value function is component additive, then
the value generated by any component to be allocated to the players among that
component.
Equal Bargaining Power
An allocation rule satisﬁes equal bargaining power5 if for any component additive
v and g ∈ G
Yi(g,v) − Yi(g − ij,v)=Yj(g,v) − Yj(g − ij,v).
Note that equal bargaining power does not require that players split the marginal
value of a link. It just requires that they equally beneﬁt or suﬀer from its addition.
It is possible (and generally the case) that Yi(g) − Yi(g − ij)+Yj(g) − Yj(g − ij)  =
v(g) − v(g − ij).
A Characterization of the Myerson Value
The following characterization of the Myerson value is from Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) and is an easy extension of a theorem of Myerson (1977).6
5This was called “fairness” by Myerson (1977).
6Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) extend the characterization to allow for weighted bargaining power,
and show that one obtains a version of a weighted Myerson Value.
9Theorem 1 Y satisﬁes component balance and equal bargaining power if and only if
Y (g,v)=Y MV(g,v) for all g ∈ G and any component additive v.
Note that the above characterization only holds on component additive value functions.7
Examples and Criticisms
Let us now examine a series of examples that I argue show shortcomings of the
Myerson Value in network games, and also provide insight into how those shortcomings
might be traced to the conditions of equal bargaining power and component balance.
Example 1 Insensitivity of the Myerson Value to Alternative Networks
Let v({12})=v({23})=1 ,v({12,23}) = 1, and v(g) = 0 for all other networks.
Let v (g) = 1 for all g  = ∅. That is, under v  the value of any non-empty network
is 1.
So, under v player 2 is need to generate any value, while under v  all non-empty
networks generate the same value and so player 2’s criticality is quite diﬀerent under
the two value functions.
















7Myerson (1977) built component balance into his deﬁnition of an allocation rule, as the value that
accrues to the grand coalition in a communication game is by deﬁnition determined in a component
additive way. However, once one turns to network games one admits the possibility of externalities
across components and has to be explicit about the component additivity of the value function in





















































































Here, regardless of the distinction between v and v , player 2 gets a larger allocation
in the network {12,23} than the other players. This reﬂects player 2’s status in two
links in the network, and comes about through the Shapley value style calculations
11underlying the Myerson value, where we can think of building up the network {12,23}
by adding players one at a time.
While player 2’s role is special in the network {12,23} in the sense that she is
involved in two links while the other players are only involved in one, player 2’s status
is not special under the value function v  in the sense that any player could serve
the same role. If the allocation of value is decided upon based at a stage where the
network is not completely permanent,8 the fact that any player can equally well serve
the central role, should have an impact on player 2’s allocation. In fact, it seems
natural that under v  all players should receive equal payments.
The insensitivity of the Myerson value to diﬀerences in value functions such as the
diﬀerence between v and v  is the motivation for this paper, and I propose alternative
allocation rules that will account for such variations in value functions.
Before proceeding, let us examine some examples that provide a look at problems
with the axioms underlying the Myerson value. This will help us in understanding the
issues more deeply and in developing alternative allocation rules.
Example 2 A Criticism of Equal Bargaining Power
Let v({12})=v({23})=1a n dv(g) = 0 for all other networks.


























Y1 = Y2 Y2 = Y3
v=1 v=0 v=1
Figure 2
Any allocation rule, including the Myerson value, that satisﬁes equal bargain-
ing power (and allocates anonymously to players on the empty network) will satisfy
Y1({12},v)=Y2({12},v).
8Even if the network is ﬁxed, the full symmetry of players under v  suggests that we should treat
them equally in allocating value.
12Here, there is a real asymmetry among the players and player 2 is more a critical
player than the others. It is not at all clear why we should require that the allocation
to players 1 and 2 be the same in the network {12}, as player 2 has a viable outside
option while player 1 does not.
If we want to impose some sort of fairness or equality in bargaining power, it should
only apply when the roles of the players in question are really comparable. There is
a clear sense in which player 2’s bargaining power should be greater than that of the
other players, and so the title of “equal bargaining power” is really a misnomer.9
As a further note, consider v  such that v ({12})=v ({23})=v ({13})=1a n d
v(g) = 0 for all other networks.
Note that here again, equal bargaining power imposes the two agents having a link
in a one-link network each get an allocation of 1
2. In fact, component balance and any
sort of anonymity condition imply the same conclusion. However, under v  the full
symmetry of agents suggests that the more natural allocation is 1
3 to each player –
including the player who is disconnected. This points to some of the diﬃculties with
component balance. This is more fully illustrated in the following example.
Example 3 A Look at Component Balance
Let v(g)=5
4 if g is a one-link network, v(g)=2i fi fg is a two-link network, and
v(g) = 0 otherwise.
In this case, the Myerson Value allocates 5
8 to each player involved in the link in a
one link network; and 1
2 to players having one link in a two link network and 1 to the
player having two links in a two link network.
9I have to take partial responsibility for that misnomer. However, even the term “fairness” would






































































Why might one criticize component balance here? It is based on noting that com-
ponent balance sits in a sort of “no-man’s-land” here: it is not quite strong enough to
capture its normative arguments, but at the same time it is strong enough to rule out
other natural conditions.
To be more explicit, a natural and reasonable argument (and the best one that I can
think of) behind component balance is that it makes sure that components of a network
receive their due value which prevents their members from wanting to walk away and
reallocate their value among themselves. That is, in the absence of component balance,
some component is necessarily receiving less than the value it is generating. If that
component can choose to walk away and operate on their own, then they would beneﬁt
by doing so, which will upset the allocation rule.10
However, if one uses this type of argument to justify component balance, then
it is logical to worry about all coalitional deviations, not just those of components.
10Remember that component balance is always operating in the context of component additive value
functions, and so such walking away can occur without worry about what the remaining agents do.
14This means that the natural logical conclusion of the argument motivating component
balance should actually be a core property. Note, however, that component balance
does not guarantee that an allocation lies in the core (for a formal deﬁnition see Section
5). For example, under the Myerson value above, if the network is {12,23},t h e np l a y e r s
1 and 3 receive 1
2 each, and would beneﬁt by deviating and forming their own one link
network where they could receive 5
8 each.
On the other hand, while component balance stops short of dealing with all relevant
coalitional possibilities, it is already strong enough to be in conﬂict with some fairness
and anonymity properties. In the above example, the v is completely anonymous and
all players are completely interchangeable. If we then think of the value being bargained
upon at a stage where the network is still ﬂexible, it is not clear why value is not split
equally among the players regardless of which of which network is formed. This strong
form of anonymity is precluded by component balance.
The criticisms of the two properties lie on diﬀerent levels. The criticism of equal
bargaining power is that it is a fundamentally ﬂawed property. The criticism of com-
ponent balance is that it is not strong enough to reﬂect its real normative grounding,
and yet strong enough to conﬂict with other properties. Thus, one might prefer to
either strengthen component balance if one really is concerned with what value is gen-
erated by various coalitions and components, or abandon the property if one is more
concerned with other normative properties.
I suggest alternative approaches below. Both involve weakening the ﬂawed equal
bargaining power to only apply in situations where players are equal in some broader
sense. The diﬀerence in the two approaches depends on whether (i) one replaces compo-
nent balance with some anonymity or equity properties, or (ii) strengthens component
balance to be a core property. Depending on the variation, one will end up with very
diﬀerent allocation rules.
4 Flexible Networks and Equal Treatment
In this section I provide two new allocation rules which are based on eliminating
equal bargaining power, and working with equity properties in place of component
balance. The two variations depend on whether one assesses value on a player by
player basis, or on a link by link basis.
15It is not clear to me that either variation is clearly more pertinent than the other.
In one sense the link-based rule is richer in that it considers variations on a link-
by-link basis, and presumably players could choose to withhold certain links and not
others. On the other hand, it is really the players who control the links and not the
links themselves who accumulate value (as becomes clearer when dealing with a core
deﬁnition). I ﬁrst present the player-based rule and then the link-based version.
Before providing the allocation rules, let us consider some conditions important in
characterizing them.
The ﬁrst condition is one that captures the basic idea that the allocation of value
is taking place with the perspective that the network is something that can be varied.
Flexible-Network Rules
An allocation rule Y is a ﬂexible network rule if Y (g,v)=Y (gN,   v) for all v and
eﬃcient g (relative to v).
The idea that the allocation only depends on the monotonic cover of the value
function is one property that is implied from the perspective that the allocation is
being decided upon when the network is formed or can still be changed: at a time
where there is still some ﬂexibility in the network. With the idea that ineﬃcient
networks should not be formed, the allocation of value should only depend on the
value of eﬃcient networks given some set of available links, and so the monotonic cover
is all that enters into the calculations.
Note that this equivalence is only required on eﬃcient networks, as the value on
other networks might not even be the same (i.e., v(g)  =   v(g)) and so the condition
would be impossible to impose on ineﬃcient networks.
The next condition is a well-known foundation for Shapley-style calculations.
Additivity







In a way, one can think of additivity as a consistency or decomposition condition.
The way in which value is allocated may be broken down so that one may separately
allocate the value on diﬀerent parts of the value function and then sum up. This
requires that same logic is imposed on each part of the value function.
16In the context of network games is a bit too strong. It may be in conﬂict with
making decisions from a ﬂexible network perspective. In particular, the monotonic
cover of v + v  is not necessarily the same as the sum of the monotonic covers.
This suggests a more limited version of additivity.
Weak Additivity
An allocation rule Y is weakly additive if for any monotonic v and v , and scalars











N,v) − bY (g
N,v
 ).
The weaker version of additivity is one that is adapted to hold together with the
ﬂexible network perspective as it only applies in monotonic cases. While the value
functions that we are interested in will rarely be monotonic, this condition will still be
useful as we can apply the condition to monotonic covers.
The reasoning behind (weak) additivity is that if we are making calculations re-
garding allocations based on what players or links contribute to various network possi-
bilities, and we increase or decrease those contributions, we should treat those increases
or decreases in the same way that we treat the original contributions.
The key equity condition that I impose is the following.
Equal Treatment of Vital Players
An allocation rule Y satisﬁes equal treatment of vital players if vg is a basic value




n(g) if i ∈ N(g), and
0 otherwise.
Recall that basic value functions are ones where the players involved in g are all
vital to the functioning of any network, in the sense that no value is generated without
all the players in g being present and that no other players contribute in any way.
In such a setting, the players in g are all in some sense “equals” and all others
contribute nothing. In this case, the equal treatment property allocates value equally
to each player in N(g).
This is a very weak equity condition and one that is satisﬁed by most allocation
rules, with the exception of the egalitarian rules deﬁned in Section 7.
17The Player-Based Flexible Network Allocation Rule
First, let us deﬁne a rule for allocating value on eﬃcient networks, and then we will
come back to ineﬃcient ones.
Consider any v (not necessarily component additive) and a g ∈ G that is eﬃcient







S∪i) −   v(g
S))
 




On a superﬁcial level this rule bears some similarities to the Myerson Value because
we see Shapley Value-like calculations. However, it is a quite diﬀerent allocation rule.
In fact, it violates both equal bargaining power and component balance, and is charac-
terized by conditions that are violated by the Myerson Value. Most importantly it is a
ﬂexible network rule and thus accounts for the value of alternative possible networks.
This is seen in its ﬂexible network perspective, as it is relative to the monotonic cover
  v.
Theorem 2 An allocation rule satisﬁes equal treatment of vital players, weak additiv-
ity, and is a ﬂexible network rule if and only if it is deﬁned by (2) for all v and g that
are eﬃcient relative to v.
Proportionality
In order to have a full deﬁnition of an allocation rule, one needs also to deﬁne
it for ineﬃcient networks as well as eﬃcient ones. When one takes a ﬂexible network
perspective, the question of how value is allocated on ineﬃcient networks becomes a bit
tricky, as it is not clear why ineﬃcient networks should ever form. Nonetheless, we know
that there exist some conﬂicts between stability and eﬃciency (e.g., see Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996)). Thus, it is important to have something to say about the allocation
of value on ineﬃcient networks, both because such networks might end up forming, and
also because their allocations might end up being important “oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path”
considerations.
Here, I take the perspective that the relative allocations are the same on eﬃcient
and ineﬃcient networks, so that the allocation is rescaled.
An allocation rule Y is proportional if for each i and v either Yi(g,v) = 0 for all g,







18The proportionality condition takes an obvious (but certainly not the only natural)
path to allocation of value on ineﬃcient networks. Given the ex ante perspective, play-
ers allocations can be determined on eﬃcient networks and then rescaled for ineﬃcient
ones. One might think of this as a way of saying that the eﬃcient allocations have
taken into account all of the relevant bargaining and decision making that would go on
in terms of determining players’ relative contributions or power due to a given value
function.
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Theorem 3 An allocation rule satisﬁes equal treatment of vital players, weak addi-
tivity, and is a ﬂexible network and proportional rule if and only if it is Y PBFN (as
deﬁned in (3)).
Now let us turn to link-based allocation rules.
Link-Based Allocation Rules








When thinking about how we measure players’ contributions or how they bargain
over their worth, this may be done directly in terms of adding or removing the players,
or it may be done in terms of the links that they control. That is, we may think of
assigning allocations to links and then this indirectly determines how value accrues to
players.
The perspective of assigning values to links rather than players was ﬁrst taken by
Meessen (1988) (see also Borm, Owen, and Tijs (1992)) in the context of communication
games and resulted in a variation on the Myerson Value called the Position Value (see
Slikker (2000) for a discussion). More generally, we may think of the alternatives of
doing player based or link based calculations when deriving any allocation rule in the
context of network games as well.
Equal Treatment of Vital Links
19An allocation rule Y satisﬁes equal treatment of vital links if vg is a basic value





This property is a variation on equal treatment of vital players, where it is links
who are viewed as being vital rather than players, and will correspond to a link-based
version of an allocation rule.
This also might be thought of as reﬂecting the idea that it is not really the players
that are vital, but certain collections of links (i.e., those in g). As such from one
perspective it is the links which are all equal.
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To see how this rule works, proceed as follows. First, one may think of value being
allocated to links, and so the allocation to a given player i is simply that value summed
across links. Note that value is allocated to a given link whether or not it is present in
a given network - which reﬂects the ﬂexible network perspective. The allocation on a
given network is then rescaled in proportion to the value that would be allocated on an
eﬃcient network. The 1
2 reﬂects the fact that the value of a given link is controlled by
two players. The remaining part of the calculation is then based on a Shapley Value
allocation of value to links as to what they contribute to the overall value possible
under v. This calculation is from a ﬂexible network perspective, so it is relative to the
monotonic cover   v.
Theorem 4 An allocation rule satisﬁes equal treatment of vital links, weak additivity,
and is an ﬂexible network rule if and only if it agrees with Y LBFN on eﬃcient networks.
It satisﬁes equal treatment of vital links, weak additivity, and is an ﬂexible network and
proporitional rule if and only if it is Y LBFN.
Again, note that the above characterization holds for all value functions, not just
component additive ones.
Let us now compare the allocation of value by these ﬂexible network bargaining
rules to that of the Myerson Value.
Example 4 Example 1 Revisited
20This is a slight generalization of Example 1.
Consider value functions v and v  are deﬁned as follows.
v({12})=v({23})=1 ,v({12,23})=w ≥ 1, and v(g) = 0 for all other networks.
v (g)=w for all g with at least two links and v (g)=1o ng with one link.
























Here the link- and player-based ﬂexible network allocation rules provide diﬀerent
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There are several things to note. Both allocation rules split values equally under
v  which is consistent with the ﬂexible network perspective and the equity conditions
that they both satisfy.
The player-based allocation rule coincides with the Myerson Value on v since under
v only subnetworks of {12,23} generate any value. This diﬀers from the link-based
version. The link-based ﬂexible network rule is easy to see here as only the links {12}
and {23} generate value, but not the link {13}, and so the links split the value equally
on {12,23}. Player 2 being involved in twice as many links as the others ends up with
twice the value.
225 The Core of a Network Game and the Networko-
lus
While the ﬂexible network allocation rules proposed in the previous section have
nice properties in terms of their ﬂexible network perspective, there is a shortcoming
that they inherit from their Shapley Value origins. Namely, they are not always in the
core of a network game. In situations where players are deciding on the allocation of
the value of a network at the same time that they are forming the network there is a
natural core deﬁnition that captures some constraints on the allocation of value that
would be required to avoid certain forms of instability.
Requiring that an allocation rule be core consistent can be thought of as a strength-
ening of the component balance condition.
The Core of a Network Game
A network-allocation pair g ⊂ gN and y ∈ I Rn is in the core of the network game
(N,v)i f
 
i yi ≤ v(g)a n d
 
i∈S yi ≥   v(gS) for all S ⊂ N.
The core of a network game provides a natural look at how the allocation of value of
a network can be taken together with the formation of a network, especially regarding
accounting for coalitional incentives.
Most of the literature on network games takes the allocation rule as given and then
examines some non-cooperative formation procedure.11 There are some papers that
have analyzed the allocation of value at the same time as the formation of a network.12
Those papers examine speciﬁc demand-based noncooperative network formation games.
The core provides a protocol-free way analyzing the simultaneous allocation of value
and formation of a network.
Core Consistency
An allocation rule Y is core consistent, if for any v such that the core is nonempty,
there exists at least one g such that (g,Y(g,v)) is in the core.
Example 5 The Core
11For instance, see Jackson (2003) for a discussion of network formation games, as well as Goyal
(2003) for discussion of dynamics and Page (2003) for discussion of farsightness.
12For instance, see Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000), Currarini and Morelli (2000), and Mu-
tuswami and Winter (2000).
23Consider the value function v from Example 4 except allowing w to be any number,
deﬁned by v({12})=v({23})=1 ,v({12,23})=w,a n dv(g) = 0 for all other networks.
Note that the core is always non-empty, regardless of the value of w.I fw ≤ 1, then
the networks {12} and {23} together with an allocation of (0,1,0) are in the core. If
w>1, then the network {12,23} together with any allocations such that y1 + y2 ≥ 1
and y2 +y3 ≥ 1 are in the core. For instance, the allocation (w−1
2 ,1, w−1
2 )i si nt h ec o r e
together with the network {12,23}.
Note, however, that when w = 7
6, then the allocations of the Myerson, Player-Based
Flexible Network, and Link-Based Flexible Network allocation rules are not in the core














































































3 not in core
Figure 5
The failure of Shapley Value style calculations to turn up core allocations is well-
known from the cooperative game theory literature and it appears here too.
The ﬂexible network approach that I have proposed here can also be combined with
other ways of dividing up value among a group of players (or links). Thus, there is a
natural variation of the Nucleolus that can be deﬁned for network games.
24The Nucleolus deﬁned by Schmeidler (1969) has the very desirable property that
it always lies in the core of a cooperative game whenever that object is non- empty,
among some other nice properties. There is a natural analog of the nucleolus that can
be deﬁned from a ﬂexible network perspective in network games. I will refer to that
allocation rule as the networkolus. There are two versions, depending on whether the
deﬁnition is link-based or player-based.
I will begin with the player-based version as that always lies in the core of a network
game when it is non-empty.
The Player-Based Networkolus
Let B(g,v)={y ∈ I Rn|
 
i yi = v(g)} be the balanced allocations for g under v.
Let eS(y)=
 
i∈S yi −   v(gS) be the excess allocated to coalition S relative to their
monotonic value under v,a n dl e te(y) denote the vector with entries for each nonempty
S ⊂ N.
Let Y PN(gN,   v)=y be the unique allocation such that e(y) leximin dominates e(y )
for all y  ∈ B(gN,   v). Then deﬁne Y PN(g,v)=
v(g)
  v(g)Y PN(gN,   v).
We can also consider a link-based version of the networkolus.
The Link-Based Networkolus
Let B (g,v)={x ∈ I Rn(n−1)/2|
 
i xi = v(g)} be the balanced allocations to links




ij∈g xij −   v(g) be the excess allocated to set of links g relative to
their monotonic value under v,a n dl e te (x) denote the vector with entries for each
nonempty g ⊂ g ⊂ N.
Let Y LN
i (gN,   v)=
 
j =i yij be the unique allocation such that e (y) leximin domi-
nates e (x) for all x ∈ B (gN,   v). Then deﬁne Y LN(g,v)=
v(g)
  v(g)Y LN(gN,   v).
Example 6 The Networkolus and the Core
Consider the value function v from Example 5 deﬁned by v({12})=v({23})=1 ,
v({12,23})=w,a n dv(g) = 0 for all other networks.
Recall that the Myerson Value, Link-Based Flexible Network Bargaining Allocation
Rule and the Player-Based Flexible Network Bargaining Allocation Rule failed to be
core consistent in this example.




2 ) which indeed is in the core.
Note however, that the link-based version of the networkolus is not in the core. In




4) which is not in the core.
See Figure 5.
The diﬃculty with the link-based networkolus is that it is making allocations based
on links rather than players, while it is the players who are critical in core calculations.
This actually suggests a reﬁnement of the core, which is a link-based core.
The Link-Core of a Network Game
A network-allocation pair g ⊂ gN and y ∈ I Rn(n−1)/2 is in the link-core of the
network game (N,v)i f
 
ij yij ≤ v(g)a n d
 
ij∈g  yij ≥   v(g ) for all g  ⊂ gN.
The link-core of a network game provides a reﬁnement of the core where it is links
that are being allocated value. When the link-core is nonempty, it is straightforward
to see that the core is nonempty.14 However, there are many situations (such as under
the v in Example 6) where the link-core is empty.
An allocation rule Y is link-core consistent, if for any v such that the link-core
is nonempty, there exists at least one g and y ∈ I Rn(n−1)/2 such that (g,y)i si nt h e
link-core and
 
j =i yij = Yi(g,v) for each i.
Interestingly, the link-based networkolus is link-core consistent but not core consis-
tent, while the player-based networkolus is core consistent but not link-core consistent.
Although I have not provided a characterization of the networkolus, there should
be a straightforward variation on Peleg’s (1986) reduced game property to derive a
characterization of the networkolus that is an analog of that for the nucleolus.
6 A General Approach to Importing Allocation Rules
As should be clear by now, there is a general approach to deﬁning allocation rules for
network games that take a ﬂexible-network perspective. For instance, one might want
to deﬁne per-capita versions of the networkolus.
13The same conclusions hold in other cases, but involve diﬀerent calculations.
14Let g,  y be in the link-core. Let y ∈ I Rn be deﬁned by yi =
 
j =i   yij. Then (g,y) lies in the core.
26In general, let φ be your favorite allocation rule (a.k.a. imputation rule, solution, or
value operator) from cooperative game theory. Noting that   v(gS) deﬁnes a characteris-
tic function as we vary S, we can apply φ directly and denote the resulting allocations
by φ(  v).
To deﬁne a player-based rule, set Y φ(g,v)=
v(g)
  v(g)φ(  v).
To deﬁne a link-based rule, we can apply φ to groups of links rather than players
(so on   v(g), viewing g as a coalition of links) and denote the resulting allocations to










The reasoning developed here pushes us towards an interesting conclusion. If net-
works are ﬂexible, then under player-based reasoning things boil down to deriving a
cooperative game where the worth of a coalition is derived from the best network that
it can form. Under linked-based reasoning, the relationship to cooperative games is
less direct, but still clear once one views links like players.
This is not to say that the networks are lost from the picture. As should be obvious
from the examples presented here, changing the values of diﬀerent networks still has
important implications for the allocation rule, and the network structures are quite
essential in determining allocations. Nor is this to say that network games can be
viewed as a special case of cooperative games. The structure is still richer and the
value of a coalition can depend on how it is organized. It is just that under network
ﬂexibility, it is the “best” organization of a coalition that is the critical “threat point”
and so one can work with this covering and then lean on the substantial cooperative
game theory literature to understand how those threat points translate into allocations.
7 Properties and Comparisons
Let us consider some other properties that are of interest, and then make some com-
parisons across allocation rules.
Anonymity
Given a permutation of players π (a bijection from N to N)a n da n yg ∈ G,l e t
gπ = {π(i)π(j)|ij ∈ g}.T h u s ,gπ is a network that shares the same architecture as g
but with the speciﬁc players permuted.
Given a permutation π,l e tvπ bed e ﬁ n e dby vπ(g)=v(gπ−1) for each g ∈ G.
An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any v, g ∈ G, and permutation π,
Yπ(i)(gπ,vπ)=Yi(g,v).
27Anonymity of an allocation rule requires that if all that has changed is the labels of
the players and the value generated by networks has changed in an exactly correspond-
ing fashion, then the allocation only change according to the relabeling. Of course,
anonymity is a type of fairness condition that has a rich axiomatic history, and also
naturally arises in situations where Y represents the utility or productive value coming
directly from some social network.
Note that anonymity allows for asymmetries in the ways that allocation rules oper-
ate even in completely symmetric networks. For instance, anonymity does not require
that each player in a complete network get the same allocation. That would be true
only in the case where v was in fact anonymous. Generally, an allocation rule can
respond to diﬀerent roles or powers of players and still be anonymous.
Most allocation rules that one can think of satisfy this version of anonymity.
Equal Treatment of Equals
Given any two players i and j deﬁne a permutation πij such that πij(i)=j and
πij(j)=i and π(k)=k for all k/ ∈{ i,j}.S a y t h a t i and j are equals under v if
v(gπij)=v(g) for all g.
An allocation rule Y satisﬁes equal treatment of equals if for any v ∈ V ,p l a y e r si
and j who are equals under v,a n dg ∈ G such that gπij = g, Yj(g,v)=Yi(g,v).
Equal treatment of equals says that all allocation rule should give the same payoﬀ
to players who play exactly the same role in terms of symmetric position in a network
under a value function that depends on them in exactly the same way.15
Equal treatment of equals is implied by anonymity and might be thought of as
more of a symmetry condition than anonymity, and is also a condition that has a rich
background in the axiomatic literature that will be satisﬁed by most allocation rules.
Strong Anonymity
A value function v is anonymous if v(gπ)=v(g) for any g ∈ G and permutation π.
Anonymous value functions are those for which the architecture of a network mat-
ters, but not the labels of players.
An allocation rule Y is strongly anonymous if Yj(g,v)=Yi(g,v) for any anonymous
v, g ∈ G, and players i and j.
15There are various versions of this property. One might slightly strengthen the condition to require
that Yj(gπ
ij
,v)=Yi(g,v) for any g. This condition would also be satisﬁed by almost any natural
allocation rule.
28Strong anonymity states that if v is anonymous, then the allocation be independent
of players’ positions in the network.
If the allocation is agreed upon at the same time (or before) the network is being
formed, then the strong version of anonymity makes sense. From an ex ante point of
view, when a given network g is formed and the value function is anonymous, then any
permutation of g would have resulted in the same value and so in a sense the particular
positions of the players become irrelevant. While players’ ex post positions in the
network may be asymmetric, their ﬂexible network potential roles and contributions
are completely identical.
Note that strong anonymity is in conﬂict with component balance. Note also that
it implies that the allocation is completely egalitarian whenever v is anonymous.
Before comparing a few allocation rules in terms of some of the conditions discussed
here, a let us recall two other allocation rules. These were both deﬁned by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996).






for all i and g.
The egalitarian allocation rule splits the value of a network equally among all mem-
bers of a society regardless of what their role in the network is. It is clear that the
egalitarian allocation rule will have very nice properties in terms of aligning player
incentives with eﬃciency.
The Component-Wise Egalitarian Allocation Rule
The egalitarian rule violates component balance. The following modiﬁcation of the
egalitarian rule respects component balance.
The component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce is deﬁned as follows for compo-






|N(h)| if there exists h ∈ C(g) such that i ∈ h,
0 otherwise.
For any v that is not component additive, set Y ce(·,v)=Y e(·,v).
The component-wise egalitarian splits the value of a component network equally
among all members of that component, but makes no transfers across components.
29The component-wise egalitarian rule has some nice properties in terms of aligning
player incentives with eﬃciency, although not quite to the extent that the egalitarian
rule does.16
Y MV Y LBFN Y LBFN Y LN Y PN Y E Y CE
anonymity + + + + + + +
strong
anonymity - + + + + + -
equal treatment
of vital links - + - + - - -
equal treatment
of vital players + - + - + - -
additivity + - - - - + +
weak
additivity + + + - - + +
ﬂexible - + + + + + -
network
proportional - + + + + + -
equal bargaining
power + - - - - + -
component
balance + - - - - - +
core
consistency - - - - + - -
link-core
consistency - - - + + - -
8 Endogenously Arising Allocation Rules
Just as in cooperative game theory, providing an axiomatic foundation for an alloca-
tion rule leaves one agnostic on where allocation rules come from. From a normative
16See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) Section 4 for some detailed analysis of the properties of the
egalitarian and component-wise egalitarian rules.
30perspective, these might be rules that we wish to impose, or that agents would natu-
rally be led to by their own volition. It might also be that these naturally arise from
some non-cooperative bargaining procedure. For instance, one sees solutions such as
the Shapley Value or the Nash Bargaining Solution popping up as the outcome or limit
of outcomes of a variety of simple bargaining games.
Here one can also ﬁnd such allocations arising as the outcomes of various non-
cooperative network formation and bargaining models. Mutuswami and Winter (2000)
provide a non-cooperative game for network formation and the allocation of value, and
it results in a Shapley Value-based allocation that diﬀers from the Myerson Value.17 In
fact, one can see that the allocation that Mutuswami and Winter obtain is the Player-
Based Flexible Network Allocation on the class of games that they consider. It would
be interesting to further understand the connections between allocation rules and the
possible network bargaining games that lead to them.
17See also, for instance, Navarro and Perea (2002) as well as Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001),
which provide for an implementation of the Myerson and Shapley Values, respectively, in diﬀerent
settings.
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33Appendix
I prove Theorem 4, as the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 are straightforward analogs
of this proof.
Proof of Theorem 4: It is easily checked that Y LBFN satisﬁes equal treatment of
vital links and is an ﬂexible network (and proportional) rule. Let us show that it
satisﬁes weak additivity.
Consider any monotonic v and v , and scalars a ≥ 0a n db ≥ 0. Then av + bv  is
















 (g + ij) − av(g) − bv
 (g))
 




Given the monotonicity of v and v , the right hand side can be rewritten as aY LBFN
i (gN,v)+
bY LBFN
i (gN,v ) which is the desired conclusion. Next, suppose that av − bv  is mono-















(av(g + ij) − bv
 (g + ij) − av(g)+bv
 (g))
 




Given the monotonicity of v and v , the right hand side can be rewritten as aY LBFN
i (gN,v)−
bY LBFN
i (gN,v ) which is again the desired conclusion.
Next, let us verify that any allocation rule satisfying equal treatment of vital links,
weak additivity, and ﬂexible network must coincide with Y LBFN on eﬃcient networks.
Proportionality then easily completes the second part of the theorem.
Consider an allocation rule satisfying the given properties. It is enough to show
that it is uniquely determined on eﬃcient networks.
The fact that Y is a ﬂexible network allocation rule implies that Y (g,v)=Y (gN,   v)
for an eﬃcient network g, and so we need only show that Y (gN,   v) is uniquely deter-
m i n e do na ne ﬃ c i e n tn e t w o r k .
By the monotonicity of   v, we can write




for a set of scalars cg ’s.
34Let G− = {g  : cg  < 0} and let G+ = G \ G−. So we can write
  v =
 
g ∈G+




Thus, by weak additivity
Y (g









Applying weak additivity again allows us to write
Y (g





Since Y is a ﬂexible network rule and both gN and g  are eﬃcient for the monotonic
vg , Y (gN,v g )=Y (g ,v g ). By equal treatment of vital links, this (and thus the right
hand side of the equation above) is uniquely determined.
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